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Firms’ wage policies:  
New evidence from linked employer-employee data1 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The research on wage policies has been triggered by the interest in identifying whether labour 
market or institutional forces shape the wage settings inside firms. This paper draws on linked 
employer-employee data and uses a fuzzy c-means clustering analysis to identify typical wage 
policies of medium and large firms in Portugal. Empirical evidence suggests that firms are 
segmented into four clusters that can be labelled according to wage rules as “Regulated”, 
“Asymmetric”, “Hierarchical” and “Discretionary”. The first two clusters comprise low wage 
firms, and are highly responsive to market conditions. The firms belonging to the latter clusters 
take advantage of discretionary power to differentiate the workforce.  Our findings therefore 
illustrate different dimensions of wage flexibility. Furthermore, we found that employment 
flexibility and wage adjustments can coexist, and affects female, young, and blue collar workers 
in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 This paper draws on the research carried out within the Project “FLEX - Flexible wages for flexible 
contracts? The dynamics of the relationship between wage policy and employment contracts at the firm 
level” funded by FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - PTDC/EGE-ECO/108547/2008, Portugal. 
The research was possible thanks to kindness of Office for Strategy and Studies (GEE), Ministry of 
Economy and Employment for access to the data, Quadros de Pessoal. This paper has benefited from 
helpful comments by two anonymous referees, by Helena Lopes and participants of Industrial Relations in 
Europe Conference (IREC), Lisbon, 5-7 September 2012 and 10th European Conference of the 
International Labour and Employment Relations Association (ILERA), Amsterdam, 20-22 June 2013. We 
particularly acknowledge the support from Diana Alves. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The way wages are allocated across individuals within firms reflects the influence of factors that 
are beyond human capital predictions (Prendergast, 1998). Employers tend to design and 
implement compensation systems to accomplish specific goals and needs (Dulebohn and 
Werling, 2007). The perception that firms seek to achieve an intentional wage policy, that 
allows to develop specific skills, economise transaction costs and at the same time guarantee 
efficient governance, can be traced back to the internal labour market model  (ILM) (Doeringer 
and Piore, 1971). A further contribution on the subject comes from Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom (1994) who offer an empirical picture of wage policy of one single firm. Their most 
relevant conclusion is that “none of the three leading theories – on-the-job training, learning and 
incentives, alone can explain the data” and thus in practice wage theories are expected to 
overlap (Levine et al., 2002). Despite the relevance of that research, it has the limitations of a 
case study and does not make it clear if or how one theory takes precedence over others, if at all. 
Our empirical research draws on Portuguese linked employer-employee data (LEED), 
known as Quadros de Pessoal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005; Cardoso and Portela, 2009), and 
examines the wage policy of 2220 medium and large sized firms which account for about 800 
thousand workers and aim to identify typical wage policies that prevail in the Portuguese 
economy and subsequently ascertain how they interact with workplace characteristics. It refers 
to the year of 2009. The data on wages provided by LEED were coarse grained into firm level 
data and used to construct potential indicators of wage policy, as in Lazear and Shaw (2006). 
The design of variables took into account the different dimensions and the associated 
rules of wage policies reported in economic literature. It includes equity concerns as in the ILM 
model (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and collective bargaining models (OECD, 2004); response 
to market conditions studied in wage cyclicality models (Devereux and Hart, 2006); and 
incentive devices detailed in performance related pay models (Medoff and Abraham, 1980). We 
focus on the way firms combine different rules and procedures given the wage levels, hierarchy, 
growth and flexibility that can crystallise a wage policy.  
The resulting data on firms were submitted to a fuzzy clustering analysis. We decided to 
use this approach to decompose firm data because it allows us to operationalise concepts that 
underline theoretical models, to configure the concepts into wage determination theories (Kvist, 
2007) and to assess how each firm positions itself in the context set out by actual wage policies. 
In practice, typical wage policies are intended as labels that allow the estimated prevalent 
conditions or fuzzy clusters to be linked to one or more wage theory.  
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In the subsequent data analysis, we focused on the workplace characteristics associated with the 
fuzzy clusters that emerged from the first empirical stage. While the effects of size and industry 
affiliation on wage differentials have been largely explored in the literature (Groshen, 1991; 
Brown and Medoff, 1989), little attention has been given to the relationship between wage 
policy and employment contracts (Bhandari and Heshmati, 2008; Dias, Marques and Martins, 
2012). The originality of our research lies in the use of an adequate analytical tool which 
enables us to describe the diversity of wage policies and to link them to workplace 
characteristics. 
The following questions guided our research. How do firms combine wage rules that 
shape their wage policy? What is the wage structure of a firm like? Are wages responsive to 
market conditions? Are wages more rigid/flexible in firms that make more intense use of 
standard/flexible contracts? Do particular groups of workers benefit/suffer from specific wage 
and contract rules?  
The paper is organised in the following manner. Section 2 offers a survey of literature 
on wage policies in economic literature. Section 3 details the data and methodological options 
regarding wage rules variables, while Section 4 explains the motivation to use fuzzy clustering 
analysis to identify wage policy patterns. The empirical results are presented and discussed in 
Section 5. Herein, we analyse the wage policy patterns and the associated workplace 
characteristics. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
2. WAGE POLICIES IN ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
 
The rules and procedures associated with wage decisions and other internal functioning of firms 
have long been regarded as a mysterious “black box”. Despite the relevance of this topic, the 
literature has progressed on the basis of human capital theory that generally points to individual 
skills as the primary source of wage differentials (Becker, 1964). A clear understanding of the 
internal organisation of firms provides an insight into the way labour markets operate, and is 
particularly linked to the internal labour market (ILM) model (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). 
Researchers have been interested in the question on whether the wage settings inside firms are 
shaped by the market or institutional forces (e.g. Lin, 2005; Hassink and Russo, 2008). 
From the classical competitive perspective of the labour market, buyers and sellers meet 
to transact hours of work and agree on a price which translates into a wage rate. Accordingly, 
the employment relationship is a spot market transaction that in many ways resembles the 
transaction of goods or services, whereby the price is adjusted to bring supply and demand into 
equilibrium. So, firms may adjust nominal or real wages to supply and demand shocks (Baker, 
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Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994; Devereux and Hart, 2006; Caju, Rycx, and Tojerow 2008; Seltzer, 
2010; Portugal, Carneiro and Guimarães, 2010) but also protect certain type of skills, such as 
specific skills (Carneiro, Guimarães and Portugal, 2009; Devereux and Hart, 2006) or 
transferable skills e.g. industry-specific skills (Weinberg, 2001). 
In contrast to this, economists interested in the regulation of the employment relationship 
claim that wages are determined by institutional processes where market forces play quite a 
minor role (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). They assume the labour market cannot be compared to 
any other market and the trade in labour services is much more complex than are spot market 
transactions. For instance, trade unions and management undertake a joint process of regulation 
to set pay and employment conditions including wage levels, wage growth, wage dispersion and 
wage rigidity (Martins, 2011). Collective agreements can be reached at several levels, namely 
single and multi-employer or industry-wide agreements (OECD, 2004). While the latter 
virtually leave little scope for employers’ discretion, the single-firm agreements allow for a 
more decentralised level of bargaining. Therefore, centralised bargaining tends by nature to 
reduce wage inequalities, whereas decentralisation gives employers more scope to adjust wages 
to market conditions and to reward perceived skills (OECD, 2004; Bastos, Monteiro and 
Straum, 2009). Nonetheless, in the context of a regulated labour market, employers can avail 
themselves of the wage cushion to overcome the restrictions posed by collective agreements to 
increase the salary rate prescribed by regulation (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005; Jung and 
Schnabel, 2011).  
Furthermore, firms set explicit wage rules that can deal with the complexity of 
employment contracts related to incentive devices, training investments in specific skills and 
transaction costs. Explicit individual or group-based incentive schemes may be used to induce 
workers’ effort, productivity and cooperation. Individual incentives include the link between 
wage growth and individual productivity measured through supervisors’ assessment (Bishop, 
1987; Lazear, 2000; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Dohmen, 2004; Serneels, 2008), and the 
dispersion of wage growth in line with the employee’s performance (Grund and Westergaard-
Nielsen, 2008).  Group incentives consist of both profit sharing schemes that are designed to 
increase productivity through workers’ cooperation (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987), and rent sharing 
schemes that, alongside cooperation, fulfil the goal of controlling workers’ bargaining power, 
promote fairness and reciprocity, and deal with failures of corporate governance (Black and 
Strahan, 2001). 
Firms may develop long-term employment relationships and rules that commit workers to 
certain behaviours (Abraham and Prosch, 2000), or allow wage adjustments on the basis of 
information on worker skills (Holmstrom, 1982). For instance, Lazear (1979) points to deferred 
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compensation as a motivator for developing long-term relationships. Seniority-based pay 
schemes involve lower wages at the start of the career than the wages implied by productivity. 
However, workers can expect to be rewarded in the future. This procedure potentially prevents 
and discourages workers from leaving the firm unless they achieve a better position in the 
external labour market. Learning models point to the evolution of wages according to the arrival 
of information about workers’ abilities and productivity (Farber and Gibbons, 1996). 
The internal labour market (ILM) model follows the same rationale of promoting a long-
term relationship between employees and organisations and, at the same time, aims to protect 
investments in firm-specific skills. In an ILM, job assignment and pay system are clearly 
integrated in a highly codified pay structure set by collective agreements or managerial 
decisions. Wages are then attached to jobs rather than to workers. In other words, wages depend 
on the position in the pay structure where high-level jobs are clearly associated with high pay. 
The scope for employer discretion is limited (Grimshaw et al., 2001), while incentives 
mechanisms arise from differences in pay between levels and internal promotion. Wages are 
shielded from the competition of the external labour market, with a kind of wage rigidity that 
does not allow the wage to adjust to the business cycle or other external factors. Furthermore, in 
ILMs, wages rarely rely on performance evaluation or any other form of incentive pay (Levine 
et al., 2002).    
Nevertheless, firms adopting ILM or other standardised rules may be challenged to 
promote incentive devices to differentiate employees according to observable or non-observable 
characteristics. Therefore, the scope of employer discretion entails a strengthening of 
instruments that favours wage differentiation, e.g. within levels dispersion, and consequently 
leads to an individualisation of the employment relationship. However, empirical evidence does 
not support any deep-seated change from ILM to the new model (Levine et al., 2002). 
Despite the relevance of the reported literature, the focus has been on the individual 
worker. The way that firms combine different rules and procedures regarding wage level, 
hierarchy, growth and flexibility which crystallise a wage policy is little explored in the 
literature. The research efforts reported have given rise to the following research hypothesis that 
will be submitted to empirical test: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms make specific combinations of wage rules and procedures that 
position them closer to (far from) a pure model. 
 
In relation to wage decisions, there is a fair amount of research that focuses on the relationship 
between wage rules and firms’ characteristics. Groshen (1991), for example, surveys the 
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literature about firm size and industry affiliation effects. Structured labour markets such as ILM 
are more likely to exist in large firms (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) because of substantial fixed 
costs that presume a long-term employment relationship, progression rules structured in job 
ladders, and detailed division of labour (Levine et al., 2002). 
Additionally, firms tend to merge internal options with external labour market 
information to position themselves in the labour market. By matching the competition, firms 
attempt to keep labour costs comparable to those of competitors; lead policy (i.e. higher-wages) 
makes firms attractive while the lag approach positions firms below competitors (Fisher, 
Schoenfeldt and Shaw, 1996). High-wage and low-wage firms coexist in the labour market. 
High-wages are expected to occur more in large firms (Brown and Medoff, 1989), which are 
more productive and capital-intensive and employ more high-skilled workers than small firms 
(Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999). Belfield and Wei (2004) relate a sizeable wage 
premium in large firms with the presence of ILM.  
Several studies have acknowledged large and persistent wage differentials among 
industries (Krueger and Summers, 1988) indicating that workers gain rents in some sectors. 
ILM are more common in certain industries (see Grimshaw et al., 2001)  like for example the 
banking industry (Seltzer and Frank, 2007; Seltzer, 2010; Suleman and Sgobbi, 2010; Suleman, 
2012), while labour intensive industries, such as textile and clothing, pay lower wages to face 
intensive international competition (Nordås, 2004). The latter industries represent ports of entry 
in the labour market for low-skilled labour and accommodate a large proportion of the female 
labour force. Cost cutting strategies also explain wage differentials between permanent and 
flexible workers as reported by Bhandari and Hesmati (2008) in their study on Indian 
manufacturing. 
The following hypotheses have emerged from the literature on what factors influence 
firms’ decisions regarding their wage policy: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The wage policy model is conditioned by firm size and production technology;  
 
Hypothesis 3: Market competition contributes to shaping wage rules. Price sensitive product 
markets and labour intensive industries impose cost pressures and, at the same time, lead to 
strategies to lower wage and job quality. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Sorting workers by skills influences firm decisions. 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF DATA  
 
The potential of LEED for a deeper understanding of the labour market and its policy relevance 
is well-documented in the literature (Bryson, Forth, and Barber, 2006). Usually researchers use 
LEED to estimate an earnings equation to explain individual wage differentials. These 
econometric models include specific person and firm effects and are estimated by a variety of 
statistical techniques (see e.g. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999). However, less attention 
has been paid to the potential features provided by LEED to explore wage differentials across 
firms. In this case, the unit of analysis should be the firm rather than the individual. Our aim is 
to identify the wage policies adopted by Portuguese medium and large firms. Lazear and Shaw 
(2006) followed this line of reasoning to compare firms’ wage structures and hiring and 
mobility patterns in eight European countries. 
We follow this latter approach to examine Portuguese medium and large firms’ wage 
policy using Quadros de Pessoal, which  is a longitudinal LEED annually compiled by the 
Ministry of Economy and Employment by means of a standard inquiry, and it is mandatory for 
every firm with wage-earners (see Cardoso and Portugal, 2005; Cardoso and Portela, 2009 for 
details). This dataset has already been used to check the impact of firms’ characteristics on 
several labour market outcomes. Cardoso (2000) shows that Portuguese firms reward human 
capital differently; Lima and Pereira (2003) suggest that employer learning impacts workers’ 
careers in large firms; Cardoso and Portugal (2005) offer evidence on employers’ discretionary 
power using a wage cushion to individualise wages; Carneiro, Guimarães and Portugal (2009) 
point out the procyclicality of real wages; and Portugal (2008) offers evidence on rent sharing 
schemes. Firms also segment their workforce on the basis of the labour contract, differentiating 
workers by age (Martins, 2007) and tenure (Carneiro, Guimarães and Portugal, 2009). These 
studies have a common denominator as they use the worker as the unit of analysis rather than 
the firm, and focus on a particular dimension of wage policy. Our study puts the firm at the 
centre of analysis, and attempts to offer a comprehensive picture of firms’ wage policies in 
medium and large sized firms in Portugal. For this purpose, we selected a sample of firms 
according to specific criteria, namely firms with at least 80 employees; this gives a sample size 
of 2220 firms, accounting for about 800 thousand workers. 
Following the various above-mentioned theories, we constructed a set of variables 
associated with rules and procedures of a wage policy grouped around four wage dimensions: 
level, hierarchy, growth and flexibility. In so doing, we were able to simultaneously examine 
wage distribution; the link between wages and occupational structure; wage changes; and the 
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use of wages as an adjustment process. We stress that the firm data are calculated by averaging 
out the data at the worker level. 
Table 1 details the 17 variables constructed to address the four dimensions referred 
above.  The variables account for pay practices at the firm level and, on the whole, allow us to 
characterise the underlying wage policy. 
Table 1 
Variables used to define wage rules 
 
 
Variable short name Variable specification Information provided 
Wage levels 
Hourly wage Average total wage: firm average hourly wage  Distribution of wages Position of firm 
vis-à-vis the competition in the general 
labour market 
Firm/industry wage Average total wage comparatively to industry: 
Proportional difference between firm’s average 
total hourly wage and the average wage in the 
industry 
Position of firm vis-à-vis the direct 
competitors in the industry labour 
market 
90/10 Wage dispersion: Proportional wage gap 
between the 90th and the 10th percentiles 
Inequality between high-wage and low-
wage earners. Wage differentials to 
reward skills 
Gini Wage dispersion: Gini coeficient Overall inequality of wage distribution 
Skewness Wage asymmetry: Skewness of total wage Degree of asymmetry of wages 
Wage differentials to reward skills 
Entry-wage Entry level wage: Wage differential between 
newly hired (tenure up to one year) and 
incumbents 
Competition around general skills or 
value of specific or general skills 
Insiders/outsiders Entry-level wage: Wage differential between 
insiders in the core job and outsiders that go to 
the core job 
Competition around general skills or 
value of specific or general skills 
Education premium Education premium: Pearson correlation 
between years of schooling and hourly wage 
Value of general skills 
Wage hierarchy 
Wage hierarchy Pay structure: Spearman correlation between job 
level and wage 
Wages tied to job hierarchy 
Intra job dispersion Within job dispersion: coefficient of variation 
(CV) of total wages in core job 
Internal equity controlling for job level. 
Incentive devices within job 
Wage growth 
Wage growth Average wage growth: wage increase in last four 
years 
High and low wage growth firms 
Growth dispersion Growth dispersion: standard Deviation (SD) of 
average wage growth 
Distribution of wage growth 
Wage growth used as incentive 
Growth skewness Selection in wage growth: skewness of wage 
growth 
Selective incentive devices 
Tenure profile Wage growth and tenure: Pearson correlation 
between wage and tenure  
Value of firm-specific skills 
Wage flexibility 
Wage cushion Wage cushion: difference between total wage 
and bargained wage 
Incentive devices: employers’ discretion 
to individualise wages 
Wage adjustment Cyclicality of wages: elasticity of wages to 
unemployment rate  
Wages used as adjustment process 
Rent sharing Rent sharing: Pearson correlation between mean 
wage and firm sales of previous year 
Incentive devices: employers’ discretion 
to obtain cooperation 
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Although some variables are self-descriptive, as is the case of static dispersion indicators, others 
deserve further explanation. This is mostly the case of dynamic variables, but the same applies 
to the variables that are not readily available in the dataset. 
Hourly wage represents an employee’s real wage including base pay, additional 
payments paid regularly and payment of overtime
2
. A simple correlation appeared suitable to 
obtain the wage hierarchy that relates the eight levels job hierarchy
3
  with wages; the education 
premium represents the correlation between years of schooling and wages; while the tenure 
profile corresponds to the correlation between years with the same employer and wages. 
Now we turn to variables that demanded specific calculations. For example, the wage 
cushion is the ratio of individual total wage to base pay that generally corresponds to contractual 
wage defined in collective agreement
4
. The sensitivity of wages to labour market conditions, 
labelled wage adjustment, represents the proportional change in the average firm’s wage divided 
by the proportional change in the unemployment rate in the previous year
5
. The variables to 
explore the employers’ capacity  to attract a skilled workforce from the labour market include 
entry-level wages consisting of proportional wage differentials between newly hired (tenure up 
to one year) and incumbents. The same idea is also explored for insider-outsider wage 
differentials for the modal job inside each firm. We note that static variables refer to the year of 
2009, the last available dataset, while dynamic variables cover the five-year period from 2005 to 
2009. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of variables related to wage dimensions specifically 
level, structure, growth and flexibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The wages were deflated using the price index from 1994. The total wage was then divided by total 
working time including overtime. 
3 The eight levels include apprentices, interns and trainees; non-qualified professionals; semi-qualified 
professionals; qualified professionals; higher-qualified professionals; supervisors, team-leaders; 
intermediary executives; and top executives. 
4 According to Cardoso and Portugal (2005), the correlation between base pay and contractual wage is 
high. For this reason, they and we use the mode of the base wage for a given job category as contractual 
wage and calculate the wage cushion. 
5   Previous year’s unemployment rate seems to be more appropriate since, in Portugal, wages are 
negotiated at the end of year before being implemented at the start of the next year. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the 17 variables used to study the wage policy of firms 
 
 
Variables Mean sd 
Hourly wage 4.75 2.55 
Firm/industry wage 0.14 0.43 
90/10 1.63  1.06 
Gini 0.23  0.08 
Skewness 3.68 2.08 
Entry-wage -0.12 0.24 
Insiders/outsiders 0.02 0.03 
Education premium 0.37 0.19 
Wage hierarchy -0.65  0.19 
Intra job dispersion 0.25 0.16 
Wage growth 0.04 0.04 
Growth dispersion 0.11  0.06 
Growth skewness 2.15 1.34 
Tenure profile 0.18 0.23 
Wage cushion 1.86 0.93 
Wage adjustment -0.30 1.39 
Rent sharing 0.10  0.55 
 
The multivariate firm data were submitted in the first stage to a fuzzy clustering analysis in 
order to identify wage typologies that prevail among medium and large sized firms. 
Hypothetically, each typology characterises the typical wage policy of firms and subsequently 
allows it to be labelled. In the second stage of data analysis, we used a set of variables related to 
workplace characteristics to analyse how they interact with those typologies, namely workforce 
characteristics, firm size, industry affiliation, equity composition, and regulations through 
collective bargaining (see Table 6). Ultimately, we aim to examine how they interact with a 
particular wage policy. 
 
4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: FUZZY CLUSTERING 
 
We propose to empirically construct typical patterns or typologies that prevail in the universe of 
medium and large sized Portuguese firms so as to identify the existing wage policies.  More 
specifically, we want to assign N = 2200  firms to a smaller number of     clusters, i.e. 
typologies, although we have no prior information about    nor to which cluster(s) a particular 
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firm should belong. What type of cluster analysis should be performed to tackle such 
heterogeneous population? 
Where it is difficult to clearly identify a sharp boundary between typologies, as in the case of 
firms’ data,   fuzzy clustering approach is recommended to perform data analysis (Hwang, 
DeSarbo and Takane, 2007). Fuzzy clustering is an overlapping method of data decomposition 
where each case (i.e. firm) is allowed to be a partial member of two or more clusters at the same 
time. Partial membership of a case in a cluster is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates how 
close or far the case is from that cluster. Therefore, a membership of 0 corresponds to no 
membership at all, whereas a full membership in a cluster is represented by 1. A fuzzy 
approach, together with the concept of partial membership, potentially allows the details of 
firms’ individual practices to be captured as it does not force any firm to fully belong to one 
cluster. The memberships of a given set of firms may, for instance, indicate whether there is a 
second-best cluster affecting the wage structure, and subsequently allows the underlying 
workplace characteristics to be examined (Everit et al., 2011).  
The data analysis was carried out through fuzzy c-means algorithm (Bezdek, 1981). To 
run this algorithm we must define a priori the number of clusters c and the weighting exponent 
m. For the purpose of the number of clusters, we used the subtractive clustering method (Chiu, 
1994) and realised that the solution of c = 4 clusters would be more consistent than any other. 
Based on this cluster solution, we run the algorithm for different values of m which accounts for 
the fuzziness of c clusters, and found m = 1.6 to be a suitable value for our dataset. 
The output of fuzzy c-means algorithm is a set of c prototypes (technically, cluster 
centroids) and, for each firm, the corresponding membership degrees to those prototypes, which 
form a fuzzy c-partition. The prototypes are full members of fuzzy clusters in the classical 
sense, i.e. have a membership of one in fuzzy clusters. Although they are useful to characterise 
wage policies, it is convenient for practical purposes to relax the condition of full membership 
to some high level of similarity (Normander and Prosser, 2000) that somehow expresses a 
threshold of strong agreement (Bezdek, 1974) with either one or more group of clusters. This 
procedure potentially provides a more insightful picture of the distribution of firms in the 
context set out by existing wage policies as well as on workplace characteristics that might be 
influencing their wage policy. In our study, we fixed the referred threshold to       . 
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
a. Wage typologies 
 
Table 3 displays the distribution of the 2220 firms on the estimated fuzzy 4-partition. As 
mentioned above, the different groups were constructed on the basis of a level of similarity of 
0.75 or more.  In this table, we deliberately used the letters V, E and F (Vertex, Edge and Face) 
to denote different groups in the fuzzy partition to mimic its geometrical counterpart. Prototypes 
are termed, P1, P2, P3 and P4. Prototype P1 is labelled as “Regulated”; P2 as “Asymmetric”; P3 
as “Hierarchical”; and finally P4 as “Discretionary”. Below we explain the reasons underlying 
this labelling.  
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Portuguese firms on the fuzzy 4-partition 
(level of similarity       ) 
Membership in Total = 2220 
 One Fuzzy Cluster  
                844 
(38.0%) 405 (18.2%) 185 (8.3%) 103 (4.6%) 151 (6.8%) 
 Two Fuzzy Clusters  
                   
1198 
(54.0%) 
386 (17.4%) 41 (8.3%) 124 (5.6%)  
                   
606 (27.3%) 40 (1.8%) 1 (0.0%)  
 Three Fuzzy Clusters  
                                178 
(8.0%) 141 (6.4%) 7 (0.3%) 28 (1.3%) 2 (0.1%) 
Four Fuzzy Clusters 0 
 
The values in Table 3 indicate considerable heterogeneity of Portuguese medium and large 
firms. We found 38% of firms assigned to typical patterns, while the model allowed more than 
62% of firms to be classified into two (54%) and three (8%) fuzzy clusters. Therefore, the 
fuzzification of cluster configuration offers us a large amount of information to interpret. For the 
sake of simplicity and clarity, first we focus on fuzzy cluster prototypes, which identify typical 
patterns, and then explore the potential of a fuzzy approach to data analysis. By doing so, we 
attempt to answer to our research questions on how firms combine wage rules; what are the 
characteristics of a firm wage structure, and to what extent the wages are responsive to market 
conditions. 
The four fuzzy prototypes resulting from the application of a fuzzy c-means clustering, 
show that medium and large Portuguese firms can be segmented by wage setting decisions. 
Table 4 reports the estimates used to examine the similarities and dissimilarities among firms, 
and ultimately indicate the patterns underlying each wage policy. We first label prototypes 
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according to more distinctive features and then qualitatively describe specific wage rules and 
procedures that potentially unveil a wage policy. Prototypes were a posteriori ordered by mean 
hourly wage.  
Table 4 
Fuzzy c-means estimates of cluster prototypes (P1, P2, P3 and P4) 
 
Wage rules 
P1 
Regulated  
P2 
Asymmetric 
P3 
Hierarchical 
P4 
Discretionary 
Hourly wage 3.39 3.47 5.18 10.01 
Firm/industry wage -0.04 -0.01 0.23 0.74 
90/10 1.29 1.01 2.11 2.41 
Gini 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.27 
Skewness 3.00 6.57 3.15 2.54 
Entry-level wage -0.12 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 
Insider/outsider 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Education premium 0.40 0.31 0.40 0.30 
Wage hierarchy 0.66 0.58 0.69 0.65 
Intra job dispersion 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.35 
Wage growth 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Growth dispersion 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.13 
Growth skewness  1.91 2.22 2.26 2.33 
Tenure profile 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.19 
Wage cushion 1.49 1.56 2.04 3.10 
Wage adjustment -0.34 -0.35 -0.20 -0.32 
Rent sharing 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.13 
 
 
“Regulated” firms pay the lowest wages compared to their competitors but at the same time, 
compete for general skills and pay a high education premium (correlation education-wage = 
0.40). Some evidence suggests that firms adhere to the rules stipulated in collective agreements, 
namely the relationship between wages and job hierarchy as measured by the correlation job-
wages (0.66); the correlation tenure-wages (0.20); the lowest value of wage cushion (1.49); and, 
the lowest within-job dispersion (0.20). However, the wages are particularly procyclical 
indicating that employers strongly adjust wages to market conditions (elasticity of wages = -
0.34).  
“Asymmetric” firms pay low wages but try to match the competition. The strongest 
asymmetry of wages is a distinctive feature here, indicating that firms in this typology make use 
of wage incentives. In other words, a small proportion of workers earn high wages, whereas a 
large proportion earn low wages (skewness = 6.57). Firms within this cluster are the most 
flexible regarding the business cycle (elasticity of wages = -0.35) and seem to be far from 
collective settings. For instance, the correlation between job and wage and between tenure and 
wage was found to be the lowest in the sample. On the other hand, “Hierarchical” firms show 
the largest correlation between job and wage (0.69) unveiling some typical properties of internal 
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labour markets. Firms pay high wages, which are slightly higher than those of their direct 
competitors; use wage growth to differentiate workers (skewness of growth = 2.26); and protect 
their investments in specific skills by benefiting stayers with higher wages than newly hired 
workers (entry-level wage = -0.14). Moreover, firms tend to protect their workers, more than 
other firms, when labour market conditions worsen (elasticity = -0.20). However, the dispersion 
of wages within job, education premium, and wage cushion reveal the presence of incentive 
devices. 
Firms clustered as “Discretionary” pay the highest wages, which are substantially 
higher than the wages of their direct competitors. These firms want to be attractive to skilled 
candidates and at the same time discourage current workers from leaving the firm. In addition to 
the highest wage rate, other estimates suggest that these firms might be aware of the role a 
compensation system plays in achieving performance goals, in underpinning organisational 
values and beliefs and in meeting business needs (Armstrong, 1999). Some evidence indicates 
closeness to the ILM model, namely the large correlation between job and wages (0.65), as well 
as the correlation between tenure and wages (0.19); and the largest differences between newly 
hired and incumbents’ wages (-0.18) and growth (0.03). However, the wage adjustment 
(elasticity of wages = -0.32), the largest within job dispersion (0.35) and wage cushion (3.10) 
illustrate a substantial erosion of ILM properties and indicate strong presence of individualised 
pay schemes. Not surprisingly, the gap 90/10 (2.41) is the highest among the sampled firms as 
well as the skewness of wage growth (2.33) and the rent sharing bonuses (0.13). 
The reported evidence is suggestive of two broad models of managing wages. While 
“Regulated” and “Asymmetric” firms try to meet the standards stipulated by collective 
agreement (low wage cushions) “Hierarchical” and “Discretionary” firms use the compensation 
system to gain competitive advantage and to achieve their main goals. Additions made to base 
wage and dispersion indicators suggest that individual total earnings include schemes that may 
be contingent on some factors. In this regard, the estimated fuzzy clusters also offer evidence on 
different dimensions of wage flexibility undertaken by firms. Within “Regulated” and 
“Asymmetric” firms, flexibility is related to the use of wages to adjust to changing market 
conditions, whereas “Discretionary” firms seem to adopt employer discretionary power to 
differentiate workers. The latter model also includes wage adjustment which, together with 
individualised rules, is suggestive of segmented human resource management. However, this 
suspicion deserves further empirical analysis. The estimated fuzzy clusters suggest that there is 
a specific combination of wage rules. Not surprisingly, while firms adopting low wage 
strategies try to meet the standard rules in collective agreements, high-wage firms make a 
combination of different incentive solutions. This evidence corroborates the research hypothesis 
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that firms make specific combination of wage rules that position them closer to (far from) one 
theoretical model. However, firms use similar rules regarding the wage adjustment process. Our 
evidence meets the overall picture that the wages in the Portuguese labour market are highly 
responsive to market conditions (Cardoso and Portela, 2009). This is to say, in spite of specific 
rules, medium and large Portuguese firms use wages adjustment to deal with economic 
worsening conditions, although in different degrees. 
We have so far focused on typologies of wage policies. However, fuzzification enables 
us to examine firms located between clusters. We therefore proceed with a detailed examination 
of wage rules of firms that combine the “Regulated” and “Hierarchical” prototypes, which 
represent 30% of our sample (N = 606). The descriptive statistics in Table 5 suggest that 
incentive devices help place firms closer to “Regulated”, while wage level and other wage 
dynamic variables move firms towards the “Hierarchical” model. It appears that wage 
skewness, wage growth skewness, entry wage, and rent sharing are on average similar to firms 
clustered in the former typology, while all other wage rules are somehow closer to 
“Hierarchical” firms. 
Table 5 
Wage rules between “Regulated” and “Hierarchical” typologies 
 
Wage rules similar to “Regulated” firms Wage rules similar to “Hierarchical” firms 
- Skewness 
- Growth dispersion 
- Growth skewness 
- Entry-wage 
- Rent sharing 
 
- Wage level 
- Firm/industry wage 
- Gini 
- 90/10 
- Wage hierarchy 
- Tenure profile 
- Intra job dispersion 
- Wage cushion 
- Elasticity of wages 
 
b. Firms’ characteristics linked to wage typologies  
Now we attempt to link workplace characteristics of firms to the wage policies emerging from 
the fuzzy clustering analysis and try to answers to our research questions on the relationship 
between wage policy and particular workplace characteristics. Table 6 gives a qualitative 
picture of predominant characteristics including workforce composition, labour regulations, 
social capital composition and industry affiliation
6
.  
 
 
 
 
6  We used EUROSTAT aggregations for manufacturing industry according to technological intensity 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf and knowledge based 
services aggregations http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf. 
We also considered primary sector and construction, mining, quarrying industries. 
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Table 6 
Predominant workplace characteristics associated with wage policies 
 
Variables 
Sample Regulated Asymmetric  Hierarchical Discretionary 
N = 
2220 
N1 = 405 N2 = 185 N3 = 103 N4 = 151 
Number of workers 
360.75 180.06 801.84 293.07 624.81 
(933.11) (122.41) (2225.55) (390.66) (1522.10) 
Firm’s age (years) 
37.75 53.09 28.31 35.76 32.30 
(55.53) (88.54) (36.75) (28.55) (29.45) 
Change in number of workers 
0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
Proportion of workers with fixed term 
contract 
0.23 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.10 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.25) (0.17) (0.15) 
Proportion of part-time workers 
0.04 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.19) (0.02) (0.03) 
Proportion of women 
0.45 0.56 0.50 0.31 0.38 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.22) (0.15) 
Proportion of young workers 
0.21 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.14 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) 
Proportion of blue colour workers 
0.46 0.50 0.60 0.41 0.08 
(0.33) (0.32) (0.36) (0.25) (0.14) 
Unions (Categorical %)      
Collective labour contract 77.07* 82.47* 90.27* 82.52* 37.75* 
Collective labour agreement 5.72 10.62 2.16 0.00 21.85 
Firm’s agreement 4.14 0.49 3.24 3.88 9.93 
Others 13.06 6.42 4.32 13.59 30.46 
Capital owners (Categorical %)      
100% domestic and private 66.31* 71.60* 71.89* 58.25* 37.75* 
100% national and state owned  3.20 0.99 0.54 2.91 8.61 
100% foreign 13.74 6.67 18.92 18.45 28.48 
Mixed: State. private and foreign 0.50 0.00 0.54 0.00 3.97 
Mixed: State and private 0.72 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.32 
Mixed: public and foreign 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 
Mixed: private and foreign 5.18 0.74 3.78 14.56 13.25 
Others 10.27 19.51 4.32 4.85 6.62 
Industries (Categorical %)      
Less Knowledge-intensive market services  27.39* 24.20 42.70* 27.18* 27.81* 
Medium-high-technology  5.86 4.94 4.32 8.74 3.31 
Medium-low-technology 8.33 7.90 6.49 11.65 1.32 
Low-technology 20.95 24.20 25.95 14.56 4.64 
High-tech Knowledge-intensive services 2.61 0.00 1.08 0.00 15.23 
Market Knowledge-intensive services  4.50 1.73 6.49 4.85 9.93 
Knowledge-intensive financial services 2.97 0.00 0.00 1.94 20.53 
Other Knowledge-intensive services 14.82 26.42* 4.32 8.74 11.26 
High-technology  1.40 0.25 1.62 0.97 0.66 
Other less Knowledge-intensive services 1.85 2.22 1.08 0.97 1.32 
Primary Sector 0.72 0.49 0.54 1.94 0.00 
Construction 8.60 7.65 5.41 18.45 3.97 
 
1. Variables in white background are quantitative and the figures are average values; the standard 
deviations are displayed under brackets; 
2. Variables in grey are categorical (the sum of columns is 100%). 
3. * indicates the mode of the distribution; 
4. Boldface figures indicate above the sample mean or mode;  
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The estimates provided in Table 6 indicate that despite differences in firms’ size, “Regulated” 
and “Asymmetric” share relevant characteristics. Actually, the latter are the largest firms while 
firms labelled as “Regulated” are the smallest.  However, firms in these clusters employ a large 
proportion of women, young or blue collar workers. Not surprisingly, both types of firm prevail 
in low-technology industries. While textile and leather industries are more likely in “Regulated” 
cluster, “Asymmetric” cluster aggregates food, clothing and retail trade industries. Additionally, 
the firms in these clusters make large use of flexible work arrangements such as fixed term 
contract, and are expected to be private and domestic. 
 Nevertheless, on a closer look, “Regulated” firms appear to have particular 
characteristics. For instance, alongside industry-based collective agreements, firms adopt multi-
firm agreements to regulate the use of labour services. This type of policies prevails in less 
knowledge intensive industries grouping firms with non-for profit activities. The “Asymmetric” 
firm cluster also aggregates foreign firms from less knowledge intensive market services 
including restaurants, retail trade and land transports.  
 As for foreign firms, they prevail in “Hierarchical” and “Discretionary” typologies 
though in different industries. The former typology gathers firms from medium-high technology 
(chemical and motor vehicles)  and medium-low technology industries (rubber, plastic and basic 
materials) as well as those operating in market knowledge intensive services (KIS) (consultancy 
activities, and architectural and engineering activities). It should be stressed that industries 
related to construction (real estate promotion, civil engineering, and specialized activities of 
construction), and mining are predominant in this fuzzy cluster. On the other hand, 
“Discretionary” firms are more likely to be in high tech KIS (programming and broadcasting; 
telecommunications; and programming, consultancy and related activities), knowledge intensive 
financial services, market KIS (architectural and engineering activities, and activities of head 
offices and management consulting activities), and less knowledge intensive market services 
(wholesale trade, office administrative activities, and office support and other business support 
activities). 
An additional dissimilarity between these types of firm is related to the regulation of the 
employment relationship. “Discretionary” firms make extensive use of either multiple or single 
employer firm-level agreements. The large proportion of “other” types of agreement is also 
suggestive of the decentralisation of the regulation process. 
 Summing up, the findings suggest that there are no clear-cut wage policies related to firm 
size and industry-affiliation. This evidence corroborates only partially our second research 
hypothesis. However, some of our findings are in line with those reported in the literature. For 
instance, cost reduction strategies based on low wages are widespread in low technology 
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industries employing blue collar workers and accommodating a large proportion of female 
employees (Nordås, 2004). Cost cutting strategies also interact with job flexibility as is the case 
of “Regulated” and “Asymmetric” firms. Actually, price sensitive product markets and labour 
intensive industries are characterised by cost pressures and, at the same time, adopt strategies to 
lower wages and job quality (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, low skilled jobs prevail in low wage 
firms. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that skills influence wage decisions of 
firms (Hypothesis 4). 
There is also evidence on the relationship between decentralised bargaining and 
employers’ scope to individualise wages (OECD, 2004; Bastos, Monteiro and Straum, 2009). 
For instance, “Discretionary” firms, ruled by firm-level agreements, have the highest wage 
cushion and within-job dispersion. This is the case of financial services that stand at a crossroad 
between internal labour markets and incentive devices. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we attempted to unveil the wage policies of medium and large firms in Portugal 
and ascertain the workplace characteristics that are associated with those policies. From the 
outset, we were aware of the fact that firms do not operate strictly as predicted by theoretical 
models; instead they are expected to combine features of different models (Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom, 1994). Therefore, fuzzy clustering was a suitable tool to group firms according to 
predominant characteristics of their wage policy. Empirical evidence pointed towards a 
segmentation of firms in four fuzzy clusters that represent typical wage policies. While the 
“Regulated” and “Asymmetric” firms are characterised by low and flexible wages, the 
“Hierarchical” and “Discretionary” firms show characteristics of internal labour market but 
also seek for incentive devices.  
There is clearly a duality between firms trying to manage their workers according to 
rules stipulated in collective agreement, and those using their compensation system to achieve 
major strategic goals. However, there is a striking similitude in the use of wages as an 
adjustment process. This evidence corroborates Cardoso and Portela’s (2009) finding that wages 
in Portugal are highly responsive to macroeconomic conditions. 
Moreover, the emerged wage policies enabled us to improve our knowledge of different 
dimensions of wage flexibility undertaken by firms. For instance, firms labelled as “Regulated” 
and “Asymmetric” represent a model of wage changes responding to (worsening) market 
conditions, whilst the flexibility of wages in “Discretionary” firms is mostly used in the context 
of the probable link between workforce’s unobservable productive characteristics and earnings. 
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This finding is in line with Duarte (2008), namely that wage flexibility is greater in large firms 
because of their ability to design compensation schemes. Not surprisingly, employers in the 
“Discretionary” cluster use wage cushion, within-job wage and growth dispersion more 
intensively to differentiate employees. They also protect specific skills by paying lower wages 
to newly hired workers than to incumbents. However, these firms do not provide insurance for 
the whole workforce. There is indeed a non-negligible adjustment of wages to market 
conditions. Whether there is a segmentation of the workforce within this type of firm is an open 
question that deserves further research. From here, it stands that firms labelled as “Asymmetric” 
follow wage policies that are more conditioned by external drivers, and “Discretionary” firms 
probably try to retain high skilled workers. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence pointed to the interaction between wage flexibility 
based on wage adjustment and job flexibility. We realised that low wage firms which clustered 
together manufacturing labour intensive industries like textiles and clothing, generally 
dominated by female young or blue collar workforce, simultaneously use flexible wages and 
flexible contracts. Further research is needed to clarify the relationship between female 
employment and flexible work arrangements. 
Despite the relevance of the results achieved so far, there are noteworthy two limitations 
of this study. The first is linked to the lack information about variable pay in the dataset. Data 
on bonuses or profit sharing would be therefore useful to check for incentive models within 
Portuguese firms. The second limitation of our study is related to longitudinal analysis, thereby 
exploring how policies changes across time. While the dataset allows for further research on the 
evolution of wage policies patterns, the former limitation is hardly solved without dedicated 
data collection exercise. 
Our study could be part of a renewed debate on labour market flexibility. While 
employment flexibility has been widely studied (e.g. Kalleberg, 2000), wage flexibility deserves 
further attention due to its political, social and economic relevance. We suggest that labour 
market policies and other initiatives should be differentiated according to the dimensions of 
wage flexibility reported in this study. Ultimately, the rationale of labour market regulations 
would not be the same to deal with wage adjustment or with wage differentials. Policy makers 
and other social actors should be aware of differentiated impacts of wage flexibility inside 
firms, and how it could affect some specific groups of workers. 
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